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DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS FOR TENANTS IN
SECTION 8 ASSISTED HOUSING:
PROSPECTS FOR A GOOD CAUSE EVICTION STANDARD

by Mary L. Heen

I.

INTRODUCTION: THE SECTION 8 PROGRAM
AND HUD'S RETREAT FROM DUE PROCESS
PROTECTIONS FOR TENANTS

The Section 8 assisted housing program,' devised as an
alternative to the heavily criticized conventional public
housing 2 and FHA subsidized housing programs,J was
introduced in 1974 4 as the federal government's major low
income housing program.s The twofold purpose of the
program, as expressed by Congress, is to promote
economically mixed housing and to aid lower income families
obtain a decent place to live. 6

*

Researcher (part-time), National Housing Law Project, 2150
Shattuck Ave., Berkeley, Cal. 94704. The author is grateful
for comments on earlier drafts of this article made by
Catherine M. Bishop, staff attorney, National Housing Law
Project.

I.

42 U.S.C. §1437f (Supp. 1977), §201(a)8 of the Housing
and Community Development Act of 1974 (Section 8 of the
revised United States Housing Act of 1937).
42 U.S.C. §§1401-1436 (1973). See general(v. Friedman
Public Housing and the Poor: An Overview. 54 CALIF. L.
REV. 642 (1966).
12 U.S.C. §1715/(d)(3) for §221(d)(3), Below Market Interest Rate Program, Housing Act of 1961. 12 U.S.C. §1715z-I
for §236, Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968.
FHA subsidy programs are directed toward encouraging the
production of low and moderate income units by private
enterprise. See genera/(1'. Hearing on the Suspension of
Subsidized Housing Programs Before the Subcommiltee on
Housing of the House &inking and Currency Comm .. 92d
Cong., Ist Sess. 55 (1974).
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 88 Stat.
667 (1974).
See Senate Report (Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
Committee) No. 93-693 (to accompany S.3066) Feb. 27,
1974. 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. AND ADMIN. NEWS,
93d Cong. 2d Sess. at 4314-4317, 4360.
42 U.S.C. §1437f(a) (Supp. 1977).

2.

3.

4.
5.

6.
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The concept of Section 8 evolved from the Section 23 7
leased housing program established by the Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1965. s Under the Section 23 existing
housing9 program, the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) enters into annual contributions
contracts with local public housing agencies which in turn
lease privately owned units for "sublet" to low income
tenants. to Section 8" utilizes a modified approach 12 both for
the leasing of existing privately owned units 13 and for assisting
new construction and substantial rehabilitation of housing
units.
Under the Section 8 existing housing program, HUD
enters into annual contributions contracts with public housing

7.
8.
9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

42 U.S.C. §1421b (Supp. 1970).
§103(a), 79 Stat. 455 (1965).
The original Section 23 program had a limited new construction and substantial rehabilitation component in addition to the existing housing component. See HUD, Low
Rent Leased Housing Handbook 7430.1, Ch. I, §I , 3(d)
and 6 (1969). Current Section 23 program regulations are
found in 24 C.F.R. §§800, 801, 802. 803 et seq. These
regulations differ considerably from those of the original
program, but are very similar to the Section 8 regulations.
See general(I'. Friedman & Krier, A New lease on lJfe:
Section 23 Housing and the Poor, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 611
(1968); Palmer, Section 23 Housing: Low-Rent Housing in
Private Accommodations. 48 J. URBAN L. 255 (1970).
For an introduction to the Section 8 program, See Bishop,
Assisted Housing Under the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 679
(Jan. Supp. 1975).
For a comparison of the Section 8 and Section 23 programs,
see general£v, Note, Federal l.Rased Housing Assistance in
Private Accommodations: Section 8, 8 UNIV. MICH. J. L.
REFORM 676 (1975); Note, The New Leased Housing
Program: How Tenantable A Proposition? 26 HASTINGS.
L. J. 1145 (1975).
The original Section 23 program provides for leases between the private owner and the local housing authority,
with the PHA subletting to the tenant, or leases in the form
of a PHA contract with the owner and the tenant. See,
HUD, Low-Rent Leased Housing Handbook No. 7430.1,
Ch. 3 §2 'I I (1969).

agencies (PH As) which then may contract to make assistance
payments to owners. 14 Tenants lease units directly from the
owner, with the PH A paying the cash difference between 15 or
25 percent of the tenants' income and a "fair market rent."IS
The structure of the Section 8 existing housing program, even
more clearly than that of the Section 23 program, results in
tenants receiving what could be described as a "welfare
benefit" enabling them to find decent housing at a cost based
on a percentage of income.
Under the Section 8 new construction and substantial
rehabilitation program, HUD enters into contracts with
owners or prospective owners who agree to construct or
rehabilitate housing for occupancy partially or totally by low
income families. HUD then makes assistance payments
directly to owners. Alternatively, HUD may enter into annual
contributions contracts with PHAs which then enter into
contracts to make assistance payments to owners. 16
The Section 8 private owner retains much greater
control over tenant selection and eviction than the Section 23
owner. In the existing housing -program, the owner selects
tenants, subject to the terms of the annual contributions
contract between HUD and the PHA, and establishes
standard maintenance and repair practices. The PHA has the
sole right to evict, however, with the owner having the right to
seek PHA authorization for termination of tenancy.11 For
newly constructed or substantially rehabilitated housing, the
owner assumes all ownership, maintenance, and management
responsibilities, including selection and eviction of ten~nts. is
By granting Section 8 owners more control over tenant
selection and eviction, 19 HUD has failed to require many
protections for tenants which are now well established in its
other low income housing programs. For example, HUD
requires public housing agencies20 and private owners of FHA
subsidized housing projects21 to establish "good cause," such
as non-payment of rent or other substantial violation of the
lease, before a tenant may be evicted. Procedural protections
are also required. Tenants in both public housing and
subsidized housing must be given written notice of the reasons
for the eviction. In addition, public housing tenants are

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

20.
21.

2

42 U.S.C. §1437f(b)(I).
42 U.S.C. §1437f(c)(2)(C)(3).
42 U.S.C. §1437f(b)(2).
42 U.S.C. §1437f(d)(l).
42 U.S.C. §1437(e)(2).
Evictions pose a particularly distressing problem because
of the severe shortage of decent low cost housing in the
private market. E.g .. Javins v. First National Realty Corp.,
428 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied 400 U.S.
925 (1970) (warranty of habitability implicit in private
rental housing in part due to conditions arising from a
severe shortage of rental housing); Green v. Superior Court
of the City and County of San Francisco, 10 Cal.3d 616,
625 (1974).
24 C.F.R. §§866, et seq.
24 C.F.R. §§450, et seq .. 41 Fed. Reg. 16924 (April 22,
1976), and 41 Fed. Reg. 43329 (Sept. 30, 1976). These
regulations also are applicable to HUD held units and to
rent supplement payments,
projects
rece1vmg §IOI
§221(d)(5) below market interest rates and §202 direct
loans. The regulations were published to "harmonize" HUD
policies with court decisions requiring good cause eviction.

entitled to an informal hearing before eviction and a trial de
novo on the issue of good cause.
The impetus for HUD's issuance of these good cause
regulations came from tenant-initiated suits. 22 The leading
cases of Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority23 and
Joy v. Daniels, 24 decided soon after the Supreme Court's
landmark opinion of Goldberg v. Kelly, 2s established the
principle of an entitlement to continued occupancy in federally
assisted housing and the necessity for a hearing on the issue of
"cause" prior to an eviction by either a public housing agency
or a private landlord receiving FHA mortgage assistance.
In its administration of the Section 8 program, HUD has
demonstrated very little initiative in protecting Section 8
tenants from potentially arbitrary actions by landlords. 26
Although present Section 8 regulations do not prohibit the
establishment of a good cause hearing requirement by local
housing authorities or private owners, 21 in practice, local
housing authorities and private landlords have interpreted the
. regulations to require nothing more than written notice to the
tenant.
Because the Section 8 program was designed to attract
private participation in a program of economically mixed
housing, it poses special problems and obstacles to Section 8
tenants who, in the absence of HUD action, may turn to the
courts for protection from arbitrary evictions. This article
seeks to examine those difficulties and explore arguments for
establishment of a Section 8 due process good cause eviction
standard similar to that already judicially established for
conventional public housing and for the FHA subsidized
housing program.
22.

23.
24.
25.
26.

27.

Conventional public housing: e.g., Escalera v. New York
City Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied. 400 U.S. 853 (1970); Caulder v. Durham Housing
Authority, 433 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied 401
U.S. 1003 (1971); notice, informal hearing, trial de novo
and good cause eviction now required by HUD regulation.
See, 24 C.F.R. §§866, et seq., §236 subsidized housing:
e.g., Anderson v. Denny, 365 F.Supp. 1254 (W.D. Va. 1973);
Bonner v. Park Lake H.D.F.C., 333 N.Y.S.2d 277 (1972).
Section 221 (d)(3) subsidized housing: e.g., Joy v. Daniels,
479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973); McClellan v. University
Heights, Inc., 338 F.Supp. 374 (D. R.I. 1972); McQueen v.
Druker, 317 F.Supp. 1122 (D. Mass. 1970), See 24 C.F.R.
§§450 et seq. Redevelopment authority housing: Lopez v.
Henry Phipps Plaza South, Inc., 498 F.2d 937 (2d Cir.
1974).
425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853
( 1970).
479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973).
397 U.S. 254 (1970).
In fact, HUD encourages public housing agencies (PHAs)
to emphasize to prospective Section 8 owners the fact that
the program permits a 30-day termination clause in the
lease and the PHA's record of cooperation in authorizing
evict ions in order to increase private landlord participation
in the Section 8 Existing Housing Program. See Notice
H 77-13 (PHA} Appendix I, pp. 4, 21 (April 1977).
New construction, 24 C.F.R. §880.220; substantial rehabilitation, 24 C.F.R. §881.220; existing housing, 24 C.F.R.
§§882.215 and 882.107, 41 Fed. Reg. 19879 (May 13, 1976);
set-asides for HUD-owned or subsidized projects, 24 C.F.R.
§§886.122, 886.128, 42 Fed. Reg. 5601 (Jan. 28, 1977). but
cf 24 C.F.R. §§450 et seq., 41 Fed. Reg. 43329 (Sept. 30,
1976).
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A major obstacle to the establishment of a Section 8
good cause eviction standard, as indicated by the development
of the good cause eviction standard for other low income
housing programs, will be showing the requisite "state or
governmental action" sufficient to invoke jurisdiction2B over a
Section 8 private landlord and to provide tenants with due
process protections. Part II of this article examines the various
Section 8 subprograms in light of recent Supreme Court
decisions which impose significant limitations on the state
action doctrine.
The establishment of a good cause eviction standard is
discussed in Part Ill of the article in terms of tenants'
entitlement to continued occupancy of the Section 8 unit and
the appropriate procedural mechanisms to protect against
deprivation of the Section 8 benefit without due process of law.
The likelihood of establishing the requirement of a good cause
hearing prior to eviction is considered under the standards
suggested by recent due process decisions.
Any discussion of the Section 8 program is complicated
by the number of separate Section 8 subprograms, i.e., existing
housing, 29 newconstruction3o and substantial rehabilitation,3 1
each with its own set of regulations and relationships with
HUD. There is an existing housing program for private owners
and for HUD-owned or subsidized units. This latter program
is called the set-aside or special allocations program.32 The

28.

29.
30.
31.
32.

The Civil Rights Act's jurisdictional statute, 24 U.S.C.
§1343(3)(4) used in conjunction with 42 U.S.C. §1983, the
substantive law prohibiting violations of civil rights under
color of state law, provides federal jurisdiction over rights
otherwise protected by the fourteenth amendment. The
Civil Rights Act requirement that there be action "under
color of law" and the fourteenth amendment requirement
tbat there be "state action" are virtually identical. See,
United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966). Since
there is no jurisdictional amount required under either 28
U.S.C. §§1343(3) or (4), the principal obstacle to federal
court jurisdiction remains the establishment of "state action"
and violation of a constitutional or statutory right.
Jurisdiction over the private landlord should also be
alleged under 28 U.S.C. §1331(a), federal question jurisdiction, e.g .. Anderson v. Denny, 365 F.Supp. 1254 (W.D.
Va. 1973); Lawrence v. Oakes, 361 F.Supp. 432 (D. Vt.
1973); 28 U.S.C. §1337, commerce clause jurisdiction,
e.g .. Davis v. Romney, 490 F.2d 1360, 1365 (3rd Cir. 1974),
Ross v. Community Services, Inc., 396 F.Supp. 278 (D. Md.
1975); but see. Potrero Hill Community Action Committee
v. Housing Authority, 410 F.2d 974, 979 (9th Cir. 1969) (no
§ 1377 jurisdiction because despite some incidental effects on
commerce, Housing Acts constitute welfare legislation for
purposes of § 1337). Jurisdiction over the Secretary of HUD
may be alleged under 28 U.S.C. §1361 (mandamus jurisdiction), see Paulsen v. Coachlight Apts. Co., 507 F.2d 401 n.2
(6th Cir. 1974); Langevin v. Chenango Ct. Inc., 447 F.2d
296, 300 (2d Cir. 1971) (joinder of private landlord permissible in FHA housing mandamus action). For more
detailed discussion of jurisdiction questions in public housing
and FHA housing cases, see LAW PROJ. BULL., IV, 4,
pp. 4-6.
24 C.F.R. §§882 et seq.. 42 Fed. Reg. 19879 (May 13, 1976).
24 C.F.R. §§880 et seq.
24 C.F.R. §§881 et seq. The "New Construction and Substantial Rehabilitation" regulations are virtually identical.
24 C.F.R. §§886 et seq.
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new construction or substantial rehabilitation program may
be implemented by private developers, private developers
operating in conjunction with a public housing agency (PHA),
by a PH A acting alone, or by a state housing finance agency.
Presently, tenants receive full procedural protections only
when faced with eviction from Section 8 set-aside units that are
attached to H VD-owned or subsidized units. 33 The following
discussion therefore concentrates on Section 8 units which are
rented to tenants by private owners or private developers
(exclusive of the HUD subsidized units described above).
Although there has been little reported 34 litigation of the
Section 8 good cause eviction issue up to now, as the Section 8
program develops, 35 it will become a critical question for
HUD, private owners, and low income tenants to resolve. It is
likely that in the next few years a grnwing number of courts
will be faced with the difficulttask of balancing the sometimes
conflicting goals of national housing policy with the rights of
individual Section 8 low income tenants.

II.

SECTION 8 AND ST ATE ACTION

The maxim that the fourteenth amendment imposes
restrictions on governmental action but not on the private
behavior of individuals was first discussed extensively over 90
years ago in the Civil Rights Cases. 36 The Supreme Court held
that the wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by state
authority, is simply a private wrong.37 With purely private
action removed from the operation of the fourteenth
amendment, the courts began to search for indications of
"state" authority.

33.

34.

35.

36.
37.

24 C.F.R. §§450 et seq. But see, 24 C.F.R. §§886.122 and
886.128, 42 Fed. Reg. 5601 (January 28, 1977). The conflict
between the two sets of regulations has not yet been resolved by HUD. The regulations are ambiguous as to
whether the good cause standard would apply to a tenant
residing in a federally subsidized unit with a Section 8
existing housing certificate (24 C.F.R. §882.102) rather than
a Section 8 set-aside unit.
Consent judgments have been entered in suits challenging
Section 8 eviction and termination of assistance procedures:
Belcher v. Jefferson County Housing Authority, No.
C77-0137-L(B) (W.D. Ky., Oct. 28, 1977) (consent judgment
outlines eviction procedures for Section 8 private owners
and requires the housing authority to hold a good cause
hearing prior to eviction); Smith v. Angelo, No. 77-1740-M
(D. Mass., Oct. 19, 1977) (consent judgment establishes a
good cause standard for termination of assistance and outlines notice requirements and hearing procedures to be
followed in Section 8 assistance termination). See 11
CLEARINGHOUSE REV., 744-745 (Dec. 1977).
In fiscal year 1976, 290,000 Section 8 units ( 125,000 units of
new construction or rehabilitation and 165,000 units of
existing housing) were reserved by sponsors and slated for
federal subsidy. See, HUD Programs, U.S. Dept. of Housing
and Urban Development, 40 (Washington, D.C. March
1977).
HUD submitted budget authority and contract authority
requests to Congress in 1978 sufficient to finance 344,000
Section 8 units (110,000 new construction, 70,000 substantial
rehabilitation, 39,000 moderate rehabilitation and 125,000
existing). See 5 HOUSING AND DEVELOPMENT REPORTER 779 (January 23, 1978).
109 U.S. 3 (1883).
Id. at 11.

3

In deciding whether conduct is governmental or private
in nature, courts have relied on a case-by-case analysis rather
than on clear-cut guidelines. 38 Nevertheless, two distinct
approaches have emerged: the "state involvement" approach
and the "public function" approach. 39 The two major Section 8
programs, existing housing and new construction/ substantial
rehabilitation, require individual examination to determine
whether the requisite state action can be established under
either approach.

A.

State Involvement in the Section 8 Program

The state involvement approach, exemplified by Burton
v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 40 identifies points of
contact between the state and the private individual. In
Burton, the Court held that the exclusion of a black customer
from the Eagle Coffee Shoppe, operated by a private owner
under a lease in a parking building financed by public funds
and owned by the parking authority, an agency of the State of
Delaware, constituted discriminatory state action. The
parking authority entered into its lease with the restaurant to
ensure the parking facility's financial success. The Court
concluded that the financial interdependence between Eagle
and the Authority made them joint participants in the
discrimination:
The state has so far insinuated itself into a
position of interdependence with Eagle that it
must be recognized as a joint participant in the
challenged activity, which, on that account,
cannot be considered to have been so purely
private as to fall without the scope of the 14th
Amendment. 4 1
More recently.the Supreme Court in Moose Lodge No.
107 v. Jrvis 4 2 and Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 43
without explicitly overruling Burton, has defined a more
stringent standard of state action necessary to trigger
fourteenth amendment protections. In Moose Lodge the
Court applied a balancing approach to state action by
comparing competing private interests with the state's
governmental obligations. The plaintiff, a black guest of a
lodge member, was denied service at a fraternal club which

38.

39.

40.
41.
42.
43.

4

See. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378 (1967), "This
Court has never attempted the 'impossible task' of formulating an infallible test for determining whether the State ...
has become significantly involved in private discrimination."
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722
(1961), "Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances
can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private
conduct be attributed its true significance." See generally.
Van Alstyne and Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REV. 3
(1961); Horowitz, The Misleading Search for State Action,
30 S.CAL. L. REV. 208 (1957).
See general~'" Note, State Action: Theories for Applying
Constitutional Restrictions to Private Activity, 74 CAL.
L.REV. 656 (1974).
365 U.S. 715 (1961).
Id. at 725.
407 U.S. 163 (1972).
419 U.S. 345 (1974).

held a state liquor license. Liquor licensing was held
insufficient to implicate the state because the state regulations
did not explicitly sanction the discrimination and could not
therefore overcome defendant's "associational" interests. Mr.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, maintained that
the crucial factor was that Moose Lodge was a "private social
club in a private building." thus distinguishing Moose Lodge
from Burton. Moose Lodge may therefore restrict the type of
evidence that can be relied upon to establish a joint venture
under Burton to places of public accommodation which are
physically located within publicly owned facilities. 44 Whether
Burton is so severely limited to its special fact setting is not
entirely clear; however, such a conclusion is further suggested
by dicta in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison which limits
Burton's application to lessees of public property. 4S
In Jackson, Metropolitan Edison, a heavily regulated
private utility which enjoyed a territorial monopoly for the
provision of electricity, terminated service to Catherine
Jackson's home for nonpayment of bills. Jackson claimed that
termination without adequate notice and a hearing before an
impartial body. deprived her of property without due process
of law. The Court, per Justice Rehnquist, rejected the claim
that the termination constituted state action, even though the
utility had included the termination procedures in its required
general tariff filings with the state public utilities commission.
In support of its holding, the Court noted that it was not
evident that the procedures had to be included in the filings,
nor. was it clear that the commission had the authority to
disapprove them. Although the state had reviewed the tariff
and had routinely "approved" it by not disapproving within 60
days after filing, the particular termination procedures had
never been the subject of hearings or investigation. 46 Justice
Rehnquist went on to observe that without such specific
consideration, even approval might not be sufficient to
transform private action into state action:
Approval by a state utility commission of such
a request from a regulated utility, where the
Commission has not put its own weight on the
side of the proposed practice by ordering it,
does not transmute a practice initiated by the
utility and approved by the Commission into
"state action. " 4 7
The Court therefore suggests, in apparent disregard of prior
decisions, that the critical question is not how the regulatory
scheme allocates decision-making power, but where it places
the initiative. 48
44.

See Burke and Reber, State Action, Congressional Power
and Creditor's Rights: An Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment. 46 S.CAL. L. REV. 1003, 1050.

45.

419 U.S. at 358 (1974). It could be argued that the Section
8 existing housing rental unit is "quasi-public" property
due to the fact that the landlord contracts with the PHA to
accept partial rent from the tenant in return for guaranteed
payments from the PHA which make up the rest of the fair
market value of the unit.
Id. at 355.
Id. at 357.
See The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REV. 47,
147 ( 1975); see also Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. REV. 355-357 (1976).

46.
47.
48.
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In addition, although the private utility was in effect a
government protected monopoly, such status did not
transform the termination procedures into state action. The
Court held that not only must there be a close nexus between
the state and the challenged entity, but also a "sufficiently close
nexus between the state and the challenged action of the
regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly
treated as that of the State itself. " 49 Thus, a finding of state
action must be based on a finding that the state is closely
involved in the challenged activity itself.
Reading these cases together and applying them to
Section 8 evictions, it is apparent that tc establish state
involvement requires more than the identity of points of
contact between the state and the private landlord. The state
activity must be something more than what was seen in Moose
Lodge to be passive regulation of an essentially private
relationship. To meet the strict requirements of Jackson, it
must be shown that there is a close nexus between the state and
the eviction of the Section 8 tenant. Alternatively, if it can be
shown that the state has ordered the eviction or has overtly or
covertly encouraged it,5o state action may be established.
The public and federally subsidized housing cases that
have discussed the problem of state action all preceded
Jackson. With the exception of the Montana Supreme
Court, 51 each of the courts that have considered the issue have
found sufficient contracts between the state and the PHA or
private landlord to establish jurisdiction and to trigger the
protections of the due process clause. 52 Although many of
those courts blended the discussion of state and federal
involvement, it is important to keep the two conceptually
distinct for analysis purposes.
Federal involvement may be shown for the purpose of
establishing fifth amendment governmental action. The
Section 8 program clearly involves the federal government:
Congress enacted the legislation; fiUD has issued extensive
regulations53 and is responsible for the day-to-day
administration of the program including sueh duties as
allocation of funds, 54 evaluation of applications, 55 contracting
responsibility,56 setting fair market rent limits,57 and general
supervision of programs. However, since the requirements of
Jackson presumably could be extended to fifth amendment
governmental action as well as to fourteenth amendment state
action, merely showing points of contact between the federal

49.
50.
51.

52.
53.
54.
55.

56.
57.

419 U.S. at 351 (1974).
Id. at 357 n. 17.
Flamm v. Real-BLT, Inc., 543 P.2d 190 (Mont. Sup. Ct.
1975), cer1. denied 424 U.S. 1313 (1976). Although this
subsidized housing case was decided after Jackson, the
Montana Court did not cite Jackson in its opinion. On
application for a stay of judgment, Justice Rehnquist, acting
as circuit justice, noted that in view of the express provision of the lease allowing termination by either party on
30-day advance notice, four justices of the Court would not
grant certiorari, finding it unnecessary to reach the constitutional question.
See supra note 22.
See supra notes 29-32.
See 24 C.F.R. §§880.201, 881.201, 882.201, and 886.103;
886.202.
See 24 C.F.R. §§880.2!0, 881.210, 882.205, and 886.!07.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(b).
42 U.S.C. §1437f(c).
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government and the program may be insufficient. Thus a
sufficiently close relationship between both the federal
government and the private owner, and the federal
government and the eviction itself may be required.
For purposes of jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act
or the fourteenth amendment, state or local governmental
involvement must be established. 58 Of course, under Jackson,
there must be state or local government involvement in the
eviction by the private landlord. The following discussion
focuses primarily on an identification of the nexus between the
Section 8 subprograms and state or local government
sufficient to establish fourteenth amendment state action.

(1) Existing Housing
Establishing state action under the Section 8 existing
housing program5 9 presents no major problem because the
PHA administers the program. HUD is limited by statute to
contracting with PHAs for administration of the existing
housing prngram or to performing the functions of a PHA
directly where no PHA exists. 60 A public housing agency is
defined by HUD as "any state, county, municipality or other
governmental entity or public body (or agency or
instrumentality thereoO which is authorized to engage in or
assist in the development or operation of housing for lowincome families. "61 Because of this direct involvement by the
PHA, the existing housing program should not be subject to
the requirements of Jackson, a case involving indirect
government involvement by a state regulatory commission.
If the question arises, however, the structure of the
existing housing program also fulfills the stricter state action
nexus required for indirect government involvement. The
following description of the application process outlines both
the points of contact between the Section 8 private owner and
state and local government and the PH A's connection with the
eviction.
Before the PH A receives contract authorization for
existing units, it must make an application to HUD. Each
HUD field office allocates the number of units available for
existing housing based on the Local Housing Assistance Plan
(HAP). 62 Invitations then issue to the local PHA, governor of
the state, and chief executive officers of the counties,
municipalities or other public bodies authorized to operate
low-income housing. 63 When screening applications, HUD

58.
59.

60.
61.
62.

63.

See supra note 28.

In the first years of the program, HUD displayed a preference for channeling program activity into existing rather
than new housing. For a discussion of this pattern, see
Senate Report to Accompany S.3295 (Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs Committee) No. 94-749, April 12, 1976, at 3.
42 u.s.c. §1437f(b)(I).
24 C.F. R. §882. !02.
Each community. as a prerequisite to receiving a community
development block grant under §104(a)(4) of the Housing
and Community Development Act of 1974, must prepare a
housing assistance plan which assesses the housing needs
of lower-income persons. :rhe allocation of Section 8 funds
is also subject to the fair share requirements of §212. See
42 u.s.c. § 1439.
24 C.F.R. §882.203.
5

must send a copy of each application to the local government
in which the proposed program is to be carried out, 64 and
invite a response which is considered during the application
evaluation by HUD. 65 Although the final decision is HUD's,
inconsistency with the local HAP is allowed only in
exceptional circumstances. 66
Once the PHA is allocated units, it is responsible for
inviting participation by owners67 and determining family
eligibility prior to issuance of a Certificate of Family
Participation. 68 The PHA explains the program to the family 69
and upon request assists families in locating units. 70 The PHA
approves the lease between the owner and tenant7 1 and makes
an initial and annual inspection of the unit. 72 It also has
ongoing responsibility for reexamination of family income. 73
In addition to the above PHA responsibilities, and most
important to the issue of state action, the statute expressly
provides that the PH A shall have the sole right to give notice to
vacate, with the owner having the right to ask the agency for
termination of tenancy. 74 As interpreted by HUD
regulations, 75 however, the owner gives the family notice of the
proposed eviction subject to authorization by the PHA. The
PHA must authorize the eviction unless it finds the grounds
insufficient under the lease. If the PHA makes no finding, or
does not give notice of its determination within 20 days, the
PHA is deemed to have authorized the eviction. According to
the regulations, Section 8 existing housing leases may provide
for termination of tenancy upon a 30-day notice. 76
Unfortunately, where applicable, it has been interpreted by
many PHAs to authorize an eviction without good cause.
The Moose Lodge decision should not prevent a finding
of state action in an eviction from Section 8 existing housing;
the "business" relationship between a Section 8 landlord and
tenant can be distinguished from the social relationships
among members of a private club. Furthermore, as detailed
above, a PHA assumes a much more active role in the Section
8 program than that performed by the state liquor licensing
agency in Moose Lodge.
The eviction of a low income tenant by a Section 8
landlord also meets both of the tests set forth in Jackson. First,
the requirement of a close nexus between the state and the
challenged entity has been met by the significant contacts
between the private Section 8 landlord and the PHA. A close
nexus between the state and the challenged activity is directly
established by PHA approval of the lease and by its

64.
65.
66.

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

73.
74.
75.
76.
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24 C.F.R. §882.205(b).
24 C.F.R. §882.205(c).
Congress reaffirmed the requirement of consistency with
the local HAP in Pub.L. No. 94-375, containing recent
amendments to Section 8. See House Conference Report No.
94-1304 to Accompany S.3295, Joint Explanatory Statement
of the Committee of Conference (June 25, 1976).
24 C.F.R. §882.208.
24 C.F.R. §882.209.
24 C.F.R. §882.209.
24 C.F.R. §882.103.
24 C. F. R. §882.2 IO.
24 C.F.R. §882.21 l(b).
24 C.F.R. §882.212.
42 U.S.C. §1437f(d)(l)(B).
24 C.F.R. §882.215.
24 C.F.R. §882.107.

authorization of the ev1ct1on by the Section 8 landlord.
Second, because the Section 8 statute specifically reserves the
right to give notice to vacate to the PHA (or to HUD if acting
as a PHA where none exists), the PHA is placed in the position
of ordering each individual eviction. Even under HUD
regulations which allow private owners to give notice to vacate
subject to PH A authorization, the PHA retains final approval
authority over all evictions in existing housing.
On the other hand, an argument against a finding of state
involvement may be based on the contention that the PHA is
not sufficiently involved in the eviction so that the eviction by a
private landlord may be fairly treated as that of the PHA itself.
According to HUD regulations, a PHA may "authorize" an
eviction through inaction. This procedure is similar to the
public utility commission's routine "approval" by not
disapproving, which was found insufficient to constitute state
action in Jackson. Since the private landlord would be the
logical party to initiate any eviction process, the PHA does not
really order or encourage any eviction which is against the
landlord's will. Based on the policy of encouraging private
participation in the Section 8 program, the lease between the
landlord and tenant should therefore govern the relationship.
On balance, the above argument should not preclude a
finding of state involvement in a Section 8 existing housing
eviction case because of the PH A's responsibility for evictions
mandated by the statute itself. Although the owner has the
right to ask the agency for termination of tenancy, the PHA
has the sole right to give notice to vacate, and therefore is
ultimately responsible for termination of tenancies in existing
housing. Even though HUD regulations may result in passive
PHA approval of owner-initiated evictions, the regulations
should not be interpreted to allow PHAs to circumvent the
clear intent of the statute. If so, PH As would be cooperating
with and possibly encouraging arbitrary evictions by Section 8
landlords. 77
In addition, under the Section 8 regulations, the PHA is
required to examine the grounds for each individual eviction 78
rather than merely passing on general eviction procedures.
This factor alone should distinguish the PHA Section 8
eviction authorization from the tariff approval .by the public
v
utility commission in Jackson.
In conclusion, PH A responsibility for evictions
combined with the additional factor of the direct contractual
relationship between the PHA and the private landlord
(providing for cash payments to the landlord), should
sufficiently distinguish Section 8 evictions from the Jackson
termination of electric service situation to justify a finding of
state action even if the PHA is seen to be indirectly involved in
the eviction.

(2) New Construction
Rehabilitation

and

Substantial

Finding the requisite state action is more d!fficult for the
new construction and substantial rehabilitation 79 component

77.
78.
79.

See supra. note 26.
24 C.F.R. §882.215.
The relevant regulations for Section 8 new construction and
substantial rehabilitation are virtually identical.
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of Section 8 because unlike existing housing, the PHA is not
required to send the notice to vacate and to authorize the
eviction. In fact, the PHA is not involved in any phase of the
eviction process; it is the owner who is responsible for
termination of tenancy. Bo
The owner must follow specific eviction procedures,
however, if he intends to receive benefits for the unit during
any period of vacancy, not exceeding 60 days, resulting from
the eviction. Bl This is a critical requirement for most owners
because the feasibility of their projects is dependent upon
continuing Section 8 benefits and the need to collect full fair
market value for each unit. Although the vacancy period
payments regulation requires the owner to certify that the
eviction was not made in violation of the lease and that proper
notice was given to the tenant, HUD has not implemented an
enforcement mechanism and must rely upon such certification
by the owner. In reality, therefore, the requirement offers little
protection to tenants.
Evictions from new construction and substantial
rehabilitation units have not been a widespread problem to
date because very little housing construction was
accomplished during the beginning of the Section 8 program. B2
This situation presumably will change, with a consequent
heightening of the program's importance to tenants, as the
program developsBJ and the demand for new low income
housing increases. The most recent HUD projections show an
increased emphasis on new construction and rehabilitation. B4
Due to the structure of the new construction and
substantial rehabilitation programs, an examination of
government involvement should include an analysis of federal
involvement for the purpose of making a fifth amendment
governmental action showing as well as an analysis of state or
local involvement for fourteenth amendment purposes. The
following discussion first examines the possibility of making a
fourteenth amendment state action showing.
The amount of state involvement present will vary
according to ownership of the units, the parties to the Housing

80.
81.
82.

83.

84.

42 U.S.C. §1437f(e)(2) and 24 C.F.R. §§880.220 and
881.220.
24 C.F.R. §§880.107 and 88i. I07.
In the first one and one half years after enactment, Section
8 produced a total of 2,600 units, most of which were
merely conversions from an earlier HUD program. Jn comparison, under the first calendar year of operation for
Section 236 and Section 235, mortgages for 77 projects with
11,800 units were insured under Section 236, and 24,400
units were insured under Section 235. See, Senate Report
to Accompany S.3295 (Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
Committee) No. 94-749, April 12, 1976, at 4.
An obstacle to obtaining financing for new construction,
the 60-day limit for assistance payments when vacancies
occur, has now been removed by an amendment which
allows vacancy payments for up to one year. See Housing
Authorization Act of 1976, Pub.L. No. 94-375 (S.3295),
August 3, 1976. For a general discussion of the Section 8
financing limitations before the amendment, see, Halperin
and Brenner, Opportunities Under the New Section 8
Housing Program, 6 REAL EST. REV. 70 (Spring 1976).
Preliminary HUD reports indicate that 103,431 units were
started during the 1977 fiscal yea., ending September 30,
1977. See HUD NEWSLETTER, Vol. 8, No. 45 (Nov. 7,
1977). See supra note 35.
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Assistance Contract and the method of financing the new
construction or substantial rehabilitation. PHA ownership
would clearly involve state action, and since good cause
eviction standards already apply to PHA-owned Section 8
units, no further discussion of PHA ownership is needed. BS In
cases in which the PHA joins with a private ownerB6 to
construct units, state involvement may be found under a
Burton joint venture theory. For all other cases involving a
private owner contracting directly with HUD, state
involvement will rest on the involvement of local government
in the application process, in most cases not a substantial
connection, and in the method used to finance the project.
Local involvement in the application process as required
by the regulations is very similar to that required under the
existing housing program. HUD must forward Preliminary
Proposals to the chief executive officer of the unit of local
government in which the project would be located, inviting
response within 30 days.B 7 The local officers may object on the
grounds of inconsistency with an approved Housing
Assistance Plan (HAP). HUD must rule within 30 days of the
locality's claim.BB In addition, the proposal must be reviewed
by an A-95 ClearinghouseB9 in which the county or regional
government's comments may be added. 90 Nevertheless, as in
existing housing, HUD makes the final determination.
The method of financing used by the private developer
therefore becomes crucial. Privately financed units may
receive Housing Assistance Payments Contracts of up to only
20 years.91 Contracts for projects financed by a loan or loan
guarantee from a state or local agency or the Farmers Home
Administration 92 may be made for up to 40 years. 93 The 40year contract makes it much more desirable for private
developers to seek state-aided financing. 9 4 Such involvement
of the state may be the key to finding state action in privatelyowned projects.
If the project was financed by a loan or loan guarantee
from a state or local agency, state involvement may be found

85.
86.

87.
88.
89.
90.

91.
92.

93.
94.

See 24 C.F.R. §§866 et seq.
24 C.F.R. §§880.!02, 880.106, 880.121, 881.102, 881.106 and
881.121. The project is owned by the private developer, but
the Housing Assistance Contract is entered into by the
private owner and the PHA subject to an Annual Contributions Contract between HUD and the PHA.
24 C.F.R. §§880.208(b) and 881.208(b).
24 C.F.R. §§880.208(b)(2) and 881.208(b).
24 C.F.R. §880.208(b)(I).
Local approval of rent supplements included as a factor in
finding state action in FHA housing cases. See, e.g., Joy
v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973).
42 U.S.C. §1437f(e)(l) (Supp. 1977).
There is substantial similarity between the Farmers Home
Administration §515 program and §236 subsidized housing
program, the maj_or difference being that §515 is a direct
loan program rather than an interest reduction program.
A very strong argument therefore can be made that the good
cause eviction regulations which apply to Section 8 assisted
§236 projects should also apply to §515 projects receiving
Section 8 assistance. See 24 C.F.R. §450.2(e)(4).
42 U.S.C. §1437f(e)(l) (Supp. 1977).
See Ross, Finding a Way to Finance Section 8 New Construction, 7 J. HOUSING 309 (July 1976).
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on a state aid theory, 9s particularly if the agency has approved
the lease allowing eviction without good cause. 96 (n addition to
financing assistance, other special assistance may have been
granted the project by state or local government such as tax
breaks, 97 zoning variances, or buy-back arrangements with a
redevelopment authority. Similar privileges were instrumental
in the finding of state involvement in McQueen v. Drucker, 98 a
§22 l(d)(3) eviction case.
In the case of participation in the Section 8 program by
State Housing Finance and Development Agencies
(H FDA), 99 state involvement may be found in both the state's
utilization of the new construction/substantial rehabilitation
program and in its administration of the special "set-aside"
program.'°0 In the HFDA set-aside program, HUD contracts
with the State Housing Finance and Development Agency to
act as a miniature HUD within the state. The state HFDA then
implements state housing policy through use of the Section 8
housing assistance program. Developers apply directly to the
state HFDA for Section 8 housing assistance payments.
Through participation in this program, owners may be subject
to the state H FDA requirements. For example, in California, a
good cause eviction standard and hearing procedure has been
established by statute for California Housing Finance Agency
housing sponsors.10 1 Thus HFDA involvement is important

95.

The state aid theory as applied to a finding of governmental
action in FHA subsidized housing is exemplified by Joy v.
Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973); McClellan v. University Heights, Inc., 338 F.Supp. 374 (D. R.I. 1972). But
see, McGuane v. Chenango Court, 431 F.2d 1189, 1190
(2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971) (receipt of
federal mortgage benefits not sufficient to establish state
action); Wilson v. Lincoln Redevelopment Corp., 488 F.2d
339 (8th Cir. 1973).
96. State aid may not be enough after Moose Lodge and
Jackson. For a case which required approval of challenged
activity by the governmental agency giving aid, see Greco v.
Orange Memorial Hospital, 513 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied. 423 U.S. IOOO ( 1975) (no state action where
a private hospital which prohibited abortion was operated
in a building leased from the county for $1 per year, where
the county had neither interfered with nor sought to influence the hospital's abortion policy.)
97. A lower real estate tax assessment for a §236 housing
project was held no( sufficient in itself to establish state
action in Weigand v. Afton View Apts., 473 F.2d 545,
547-548 (3rd Cir. 1973); but cf, Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1974); Comment, Tax Benefits
Coriferred on Private Charitable Foundation May Amount
to 'State Action' - Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 49
N.Y.U. L. REV. 578 (1974).
98. 317 F.Supp. 1122 (D. Mass. 1970), affd 438 F.2d 781 (1st
Cir. 1971 ); see also, Male v. Crossroads Associates, 469
F.2d 616, 620-622 (2d Cir. 1972) (private housing in urban
renewal area cannot arbitrarily refuse to rent to welfare
recipients); Colon v. Tomkins Square Neighbors, Inc., 294
F.Supp. 134, 137 (S.D. N.Y. 1968).
99. For a description of the origin of State Housing Finance
Agencies, see Development of State Housing Finance
Agencies, 9 REAL PROP., PROB. and TRUST J. 471
(1974').
100. 24 C.F.R. §§883, et seq. Note exceptions described in 24
C.F.R. §§883.105, 883.106 and 883.107.
101. CALIFORNIA HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §41400
(West Supp. 1977).
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because it facilitates a state action showing and also may be
significant because of particularly favorable eviction
requirements.
An alternative argument for state involvement in an
eviction from new construction or substantial rehabilitation
units derives from use of state judicial procedures to enforce
the "unconstitutional" eviction. In She/(1 1 v. Kraemer, 102 the
Supreme Court ruled that judicial enforcement of private
agreements containing restrictive covenants against selling to
blacks constituted state action and violated the equal
protection clause.103 However, the application of this case to
Section 8 evictions may find little support in the lower
courts.104 Through the years most courts have felt constrained
to limit the application of Shel(v to race discrimination
situations or to transactions between willing parties which are
threatened by discriminatory judicial intervention.
The state judicial enforcement argument possibly could
be used as an added indicant of state involvement, rather than
as an alternative theory. Several courts have listed the
utilization of state judicial eviction procedures as a factor in
finding state action in FHA subsidized housing evictions.1os
Nevertheless, since Jackson, it is highly uncertain whether
relevant, but not sufficient, factors may be aggregated to
support a finding of state action.106
In summary, although many points of contact exist
between state and local government and the Section 8 new
construction and substantial rehabilitation program, it is more
difficult to show state involvement in the eviction itself. Unless
a state or local agency has approved a lease which allows
termination of the tenancy without good cause or specifically
requires certain eviction procedures, Jackson may well
preclude a finding of fourteenth amendment state action in
evictions from new construction and substantial rehabilitation
program Section 8 units.
Fifth amendment government action, however, can be
demonstrated through two aspects of HUD's administration
of the new construction and substantial rehabilitation
programs. First, HUD itself has issued eviction regulations
which give the owner control over termination of tenancies.

102. 334 U.S. I (1948).
103. See, e.g.. Henkin, Shel(1• v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion. 110 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (1962); Lewis,
The Meaning of State Action. 60 COLUM. L. REV. J083,
I J08-l I 20 (1960; Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial
Integrity: A Rep(1• to Professor Wechsler, I08 U. PA. L.
REV. I (1959); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. I, 29 (1959).
104. See LaVoie v. Bigwood, 457 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1972) (zoning
laws place mobile home park in favorable economic position,
thereby making state eviction proceedings state action). But
compare. Mullarkey v. Borglum, 323 F.Supp. 1218, 1225-6
(S.D. N. Y. 1970) with Hosey v. Club Van Cortlandt, 299
F. Supp. 501, 506 (S.D. N.Y. 1967) (finding of state a!'tion
in use of eviction procedures depends on landlord's motive
in evicting tenant).
I05. See Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973); Anderson
v. Den,ny, 365 F.Supp. 1254 (W.D. Va. 1973).
I06. See dissent by Justice Douglas, in Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison, 419 U.S. at 360 !1974), see also, Antoun, State
Action: Judicial Perpetuation of the State/ Prfrate Distinction. 2 OHIO NORTH L. REV. 722, 729-730 (1975).
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Although HUD originally made the subsidized housing good
cause eviction regulations applicable to Section 8, 107 it
changed its policy upon promulgation of the final regulations
to exclude Section 8. The reason given for the change was the
General Counsel's opinion that the owner should be vested
with the fullest degree of management responsibility and that,
in the absence of a court decision construing the statute
differently, HUD should exclude Section 8 new construction
and substantial rehabilitation units from the good cause
eviction requirements.108 HUD thus limited the application of
the regulations to those housing programs which courts had
already held to be subject to a good cause eviction standard.
Through its consideration of the question, HUD made a
definite decision about eviction procedures. Under the
reasoning in Jackson, 109 action in compliance with the
regulations which results in an arbitrary eviction by a private
owner therefore may be transformed into action by the federal
government.
Second, if the owner applies for vacancy period benefits
after an eviction, more significant federal involvement can be
shown through the requirement of owner certification that
proper notice was given and that the eviction did not violate
the lease. 11 0 Thus, HUD prescribes the method of eviction
when vacancy payments are made. If the owner has acted
arbitrarily and is receiving vacancy payments, HUD is placed
in the position of encouraging arbitrary actions. Such
encouragement arguably constitutes governmental action
sufficient to trigger fifth amendment due process protections.
Although the Supreme Court has not held the
requirements of Jackson to be·applicable to fifth amendment
governmental action, the Jackson standard is likely to be
applied by lower courts to the Section 8 new construction or
substantial rehabilitation eviction situation.'" If so, recent
mortgage foreclosure cases 112 in which courts have refused to
find governmental action in non-judicial foreclosures
involving the Federal National Mortgage Association
(FNMA) should be distinguished.
In Roberts v. Cameron-Brown Co., 113 the Fifth Circuit
held that no sufficient nexu~ existed to transform a private
mortgagee's act in exercising its right of private foreclosure
sale into that of the federal government with respect to a
federally assisted low income housing mortgage. The decision

107. See proposed 24 C.F.R. §450 in 41 Fed. Reg. 16922
(April 22, 1976) (applicability of proposed good cause
eviction regulations to Section 8 was limited to termination
of occupancy by the landlord prior to the end of a term,
see §450.5).
108. See introductory comments to final regulations published in
41 Fed. Reg. 43329, 43330 (Sept. 30, 1976).
109. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison, 419 U.S. at 357 (1974).
I IO. See 24 C.F.R. §§880.!07 and 881. i07.
11 i. It could be argued that a less stringent standard should be
applied to trigger fifth amendment due process protection
due to the relative lack of interference with the state.
Difficulties with values of federalism would be significantly
less than in a fourteenth amendment situation. See generalb·. Burke and Reber, supra at IOl2.
112. Roberts v. Cameron-Brown Co., 556 F.2d 356 (5th Cir.
1977); Northrip v. Federal National Mortgage Association,
527 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1975).
113. 556 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1977).
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is premised on a determination that the FNMA is a "private"
entity and that the terms of the mortgage should govern the
relationship between the parties. Even though HUD exercises
some control over FNMA, including provision of the standard
deed of trust form used by FNMA, HU D's regulation was held
insufficient to establish that the government was involved in
the activity which caused the injury.114
It can be argued that Roberts is wrongly decided because
of the court's failure to acknowledge the distinction between a
FNMA mortgage created by the g9vernment and a mortgage
created by private parties. This distinction should differentiate
the FNMA mortgage foreclosure case and the Section 8
eviction case from the Jackson termination of electric service
by a pfivate utility. The crux of the Roberts case and the main
criticism of it therefore lies in its treatment of the FNMA as a
purely nongovernmental entity.
Without attacking the basis of the decision, however,
Roberts can be distinguished from the Section 8 eviction
situation even though the regulatory relationship between
HUD and FNMA, and HUD and the new construction or
substantial rehabilitation private owner is very similar. 1is For
example, if the Section 8 owner wishes to apply for vacancy
benefits, HUD prescribes the method of eviction and requires
owner certification of compliance, requirements which go
beyond the provisions in the standard lease form. The vacancy
payments situation is therefore different from a FNMA
foreclosure pursuant to standard deed of trust provisions
because of H UD's more specific prescription of procedures in
the eviction case.
Furthermore, the Section 8 owner continues to receive
benefits after the eviction not only in the vacancy payments
situation, but also when the unit is rented to another low
income tenant. The continuing involvement of the private
owner in the program is ensured by the five year housing
assistance payments contract, subject to renewal for up to 20
years. In contrast, after FNMA forecloses in a Section 235
homeowner situation, FNMA involvement with the housing
unit comes to an end. Unlike the foreclosure situation,
therefore, the Section 8 eviction occurs during the period of a
continuing relationship between HUD and the owner of the
unit.
In conclusion, although it is more difficult to establish
the requisite state or governmental action in the new
construction and substantial rehabilitation programs, Jackson
should not preclude a finding of fourteenth amendment state
action if the private owner receives state or local agency
assistance in financing and if the agency has approved the
eviction procedures or the lease used by the landlord.
Alternatively, fifth amendment governmental action can be
demonstrated, particularly if the owner utilized the 60-day
vacancy period prov1s1on, through HUD's specific
prescription of eviction procedures and certification of
compliance by the owner.

B.

Section 8 and the Public Function Approach
to State Action
Finding state action or governmental action under the

114. Id. at 359.
115. See genera/~1· 24 C.F.R. §§203 et seq.
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public function approach requires that the activity performed
by the private entity be so clearly governmental in nature that
the state cannot be permitted to escape responsibility. The
challenged private activity may be identified as state action if
the private entity acts in form, power, and tradition like the
government.
The public function concept first developed from
political party primary election cases, 116 and received its classic
statement in Marsh v. Alabama.111 Marsh involved the
prosecution of a Jehovah's Witness who refused to leave the
business district sidewalk of a town owned by a ship-building
company. The town had "all the characteristics of any other
American town"11s and replaced the state by performing a
spectrum of municipal services. 119 After balancing property
rights against freedom of press and religion, the Supreme
Court determined that property rights do not "justify the
State's permitting a corporation to govern a community of
citizens so as to restrict their fundamental liberties and the
enforcement of such restraint by application of a State
statute." 120 The Burger Court has qualified the public function
concept in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., by applying
the test of whether the power exercised by the utility company
was one "traditionally associated with sovereignty," such as
eminent domain.121
Under a fifth amendment governmental action analysis,
it can be argued that a Section 8 private developer is acting like
the federal government in the provision of low income
housing. Since the United States Housing Act of 1937, 122 the
federal government has been involved in the goal of providing
decent, safe, and sanitary housing for low and moderate
income families. To achieve that object, statutes provide that
the federal government shall provide assistance to private
enterprise to meet the need.123 These factors have supported a
finding of governmental action based on the public function

116. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (fifteenth amendment forbids exclusion of blacks from primary election
conducted by the Democratic Party of Texas, pursuant to a
party resolution); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953)
(fifteenth amendment forbids exclusion of blacks from "preprimary" elections of an all-white organization run like a
regular political party and whose candidates since 1889 had
nearly always run unopposed and won in the regular Democratic primary).
117. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
118. Id. at 502.
119. For an expansion of the public function concept, see Evans
v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (a private park which had
been used as a public facility exhibited a predominant
municipal character and purpose and therefore was treated
as a public institution regardless of who held title under
state Jaw).
120. 326 U.S. at 509 (1946).
121. 419 U.S. at 353 (1974).
122. 42 U.S.C. §1437a. The term low income families is defined
to mean families who "cannot afford to pay enough to
cause private enterprise in their locality or metropolitan
area to build an adequate supply of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for their use."
123. See 42 U.S.C. §§1441(2) and 1441a (Supp. 1977).
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approach in FHA subsidized housing cases.124 Although FHA
cases were decided previous to Jackson, the fact that the
federal government has traditionally been involved in the
provision of low income housing and that the Section 8
landlord is acting to further that goal within a statutory
scheme should serve to distinguish the Section 8 landlord from
the Jackson situation.
It is more difficult to establish traditional involvement in
the provision of low income housing by state or local
governments sufficient to establish fourteenth amendment
state action. Under the existing housing program, public
housing agencies perform a state function, as established by
state enabling statutes, 12s through the provision oflow income
housing. Although PHAs administer the Section 8 existing
housing program, private owners perform many functions
traditionally assigned to local PHAs under previous federal
housing programs such as conventional public housing and
Section 23 leased housing. For example, owners select tenants,
maintain the units, and perform management functions
previously perfomled by the local housing agency. Under the
Section 8 program, the local governmental unit derives the
benefit from not having to perform these functions in addition
to the added tax revenue o!>tained from utilizing "private
units" to house its low income tenants. 126 Because the landlord
performs functions similar in form, power and tradition to
PHA responsibilities under the conventioqal public housing
program and the Section 23 existing housing program, it can
be argued that the state should not be permitted to escape
responsibility simply because its functions are performed by
the private landlord in the Section 8 existing housing program.
Under the new construction and substantial
rehabilitation program, it can be argued that the private owner
performs a state function through the provision of new low
income housing. The proposed housing must be consistent
with the local HAP and receive approval from local political
bodies. Construction of housing units for rental to low income
families may be considered a public function more readily if
the Section 8 private developer has applied to a state housing
finance agency for financing or for a housing assistance
payments contract than without state involvement 12i on the

124. For example, Anderson v. Denny. 365 F.Supp. 1254 (W.D.
Va. 1973); McClellan v. University Heights, Inc., 338 F.Supp.
374 (D. R.I. 1972); Appel v. Beyer, 39 Cal.App.3dSupp. 7,
114 Cal.Rptr. 336 (1974).
J25. Enabling legislation exists in all 50 states. The powers
granted to local housing authorities are usually all those
necessary and appropriate to provide for low income dwellings and to clear slums, such as the power to lease, sell
and construct housing, the power tt> sell bonds and to contract with the federal government for financial assistance,
and the power of eminent domain. For example, CAL.
HEAL TH & SAFETY CODE, §§34310, 34312 and 34315
(West 1973).
126. Conventional public housing requires local government to
exempt public housing from property taxes. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 141 O(h). Leased housing properties remain on local tax
rolls. See Senate Committee on Banking and Currency,
Progress Report of Federal Housing and Urban Development Programs. 9Jst Cong., 2d Sess. 131 (1970).
127. See generally California Housing Finance Agency v. Elliott,
17 C.3d 575, 131 Cal.Rptr. 361, 551 P.2d 1193 (1976).
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theory that the state should not be allowed to use private
owners to violate tenants' rights when prohibited from such
activity itself.
On the other hand, although provision of housing may
be a function which is public in nature, it is not traditionally an
exclusive state function. 128 Most housing is provided by the
private sector, with private individuals making judgments
about tenant selection and eviction subject to general state law.
Therefore, provision of housing may not fall into the category
of a power like "eminent domain" which is exercised
exclusively by the state.
Resolution of the conflicting arguments regarding
applicability of the public function concept to Section 8 will
depend on the courts' interpretation of the function
performed. If the court is willing to accept the formulation that
Section 8 provides decent housing to low and very low income
persons who otherwise could not afford it, and that the cost of
new housing has made provision of new low income housing
an exclusive state function, then the public function approach
may provide an alternative way to establish state action. If the
court determines that the landlord is merely providing housing
to a general market, then the public function concept will not
be very helpful to tenants because the activity must be a
function of the state, not merely clothed with the public
interest.129
In summary, under the public function approach, fifth
amendment government action may be more easily established
because of the federal government's more visible traditional
role in the provision of low income housing. An argument for
fourteenth amendment state action may be made for existing
housing on the basis of the private owner's performance of a
traditional PHA role. For new construction and substantial
rehabilitation, the success of the public function argument
depends upon a court's willingness to look to provision of new
low income housing as the function performed rather than
merely provision of housing to a general market.

Ill.

ESTABLISHMENT OF A DUE PROCESS
GOOD CAUSE EVICTION STANDARD

The presence of "state action" does not in itself result in
the application of the due process good cause eviction
standard. i30 It is merely a first step. Section 8 tenants must
show two additional factors: entitlement to the continued
occupancy of the assisted units, and the appropriateness of the
requested good cause hearing procedure.

A.

Tenants' Entitlement to Continued Occupancy
in Section 8 Units
The concept of entitlement to government benefits

128. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
129. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison, 419 U.S. at 353 (1974).
130. For an excellent discussion of due process protection for
tenants in FHA subsidized housing, see Comment, Procedural Due Process in Government Subsidized Housing,
86 HARV. L. REV. 880 (1973). For discussion of procedural due process issues for Section 8, see Note, The New
Leased Housing Program: How Tenantable A Proposition?"
26 HASTING L. J. 1145 (1975).
131. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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received the Supreme Court's imprimatur in the landmark case
of Goldberg v. Kelly. i31 In Goldberg, the petitioner claimed
that termination of her welfare benefits without a prior hearing
was a denial of due process. Rejecting the categorization of
welfare benefits as a privilege rather than a right, the Court
held that such benefits "are a matter of statutory entitlement
for persons qualified to receive them. Their termination
involves state action that adjudicates important rights."132
Termination of benefits deprives the welfare recipient of "the
means to obtain essential food, clothing, housing and medical
care."133 The Court concluded that the same considerations
which prompted the initial provision of welfare benefits, i.e., in
providing for necessities, should govern their uninterrupted
flow.
The Court has since established guidelines for determining when an entitlement exists in Board of Regents v.
Roth 134 and its companion case, Perryv. Sindermann. rn Both
cases involved termination of employment of state college
professors. In determining whether the petitioner in Roth had
been deprived of a protected property interest, the Court noted
that "unilateral expectation" of benefits is not sufficient. The
Court explained that property interests "are created and
defined by existing rules or understandings that secure certain
benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those
benefits." 136 Because the refusal to rehire came at the end of the
teacher's first one-year contract with no indication by the
school that it would renew the agreement, the Court held that
the teacher was not entitled to a hearing on his termination.
In Sindermann. the Court noted the college policy of
rehiring faculty members for as long as they performed
satisfactorily, and decided that since the professor had been
rehired for ten successive years, there was an objective basis for
an expectation of contract renewal even though there was no
formal acknowledgement of this policy by the college.
Recognizing an unwritten "common law" rule that certain of
the college employees had the equivalent ,..,ftenure, the Court
determined that the teacher should be granted a hearing.
Although Goldberg and Sindermann suggest that the
en.titlement concept 13 7 should identify situations where an
individual's dependency and reliance on continued
distribution of government benefits is significant enough 138 to
warrant procedural protection, the Court has since narrowed
its view in Bishop v. Wood. 139
In Bishop, a city police officer, discharged from his job
without a hearing, claimed a due process property interest in
continued employment. The ordinance defining the terms of
his employment did not fix the duration of employment, and
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 262.
Id. at 265.
408 U.S. 564 (1972).
408 U.S. 593 (1972).
408 U.S. at 577 (1972).

For criticism of the entitlement doctrine and interest balancing approach to due process, see Note, Limits on Use of
Interest &lancing, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1510 (1975), and
Comment, Entitlement. Enjoyment and Due Process of Law,
1974 DUKE L. J. 89.
138. However, in Roth the Court observed that to determine
whether due process requirements apply in the first place,
we must look not to the "weight," but to the nature of the
interest at stake. 408 U.S. at 570-571 (1972).
139. 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
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listed several deficiencies for which an employee might be
dismissed. The only process required to terminate an employee
was written notice of the grounds for discharge. The Court
noted that a property interest may be created by ordinance or
implied contract, but held that the sufficiency of the claim of
entitlement must be decided with reference to state law.140
Under a North Carolina Supreme Court decision, an
enforceable expectation of continued public employment
.could exist only if the employer, by statute or contract, had
actually granted some form of guarantee. The Court adopted
the district court's construction of the ordinance that the police
officer held his position at the will of the city, even though a
contrary reading of the ordinance was possible, and held that
there was no deprivation of a property interest protected by the
due process clause.
Bishop seems to indicate that a general inquiry into the
legitimacy of expectations is no longer required, and that the
Court may look instead to positive state law and judicial
interpretations of that law to determine whether an
entitlement exists. 141 It is not clear that the Bishop restriction
of the entitlement doctrine, motivated by the Supreme Court's
growing concern with reducing federal judicial interference
with state decision-making, 142 should apply to evictions from
units assisted by a federally designed low income housing
program. Nevertheless, the following discussion will identify
positive state (PHA) and federal rules which establish an
entitlement to continued occupancy in Section 8 assisted units
under the requirements of Bishop.
Both conventional public housingl 43 and FHA
subsidized housing 144 tenants have successfully established a
protectable property interest in the continued occupancy of
their rental units. Court decisions finding entitlement to
federally assisted low income housing are based on the
principle that the tenants' interest in rem.aining in assisted units
is more than a "unilateral .expectation;" the federal
government has pledged itself to provide decent, safe, and
sanitary dwellings for low income families and has enacted
programs to meet this goal. 14 5 Courts have noted that the
government policy of providing decent housing implies a
commitment to promote "an atomosphere of stability,
neighborliness, and social justice" 146 for low income tenants.
Such a commitment creates an expectancy of continued
occupancy in assisted units. In response to the reasoning of .

140. Id. at 344.
141. See 7he Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REV.
58, 86-104 (1976).
142. Id.
143. For example, Caulder v. Durham Housing Authority, 433
F.2d 998, 1003 (4th Cir. 1070), cert .. denied, 401 U.S. 1003
(1971); Lopez v. Henry Phipps Plaza South, Inc., 498
F.2d 937, 943 (2d Cir. 1974) (redevelopment authority
housing).
144. See. e.g .. Geneva Towers Tenant Organization v. Federated
Mortgage Investors, 504 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1974); Caramico
v. Secretary of HUD, 509 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1974); Joy v.
Daniels, 479 F.2d at 1241 (4th Cir. 1973); McQueen v.
Drucker, 317 F.Supp. I 122 (D. Mass. 1970), affd, 438 F.2d
781 (1st Cir. 1971).
145. 42 U.S.C. §§1401 and J437f(a).
146. McQueen v. Drucker, 317 F.Supp. at 1130 (D. Mass. 1970);
quoted in Joy v. Daniels. 479 F.2d at 1240 (4th Cir. 1973).
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these courts, HUD has by regulation provided all public
housing and subsidized housing tenants with the expectation
that unless there is good cause for termination of tenancy, they
may remain in assisted units. Thus, even though not all eligible
families receive an assisted housing unit, unlike the Goldberg
welfare situation where all eligible families receive benefits, all
eligible families that actually receive assisted housing have a
right to continued occupancy in the assisted unit unless good
cause can be shown.
The structure of the Section 8 program also provides the
necessary basis for the Section 8 tenant's belief that his or her
family is entitled to continuing benefits. All Section 8
applicants must go through a screening process. To be eligible,
a person must be of lower income and meet the PHA's
definition of"family." 147 In addition, all tenants are protected
from certain arbitrary and discriminatory practices. No person
may be excluded from or be denied the benefits of the program
on the ground of race, color or national origin. 148 Tenant
leases may not contain certain lease clauses such as waiver of
legal proceedings, confession of judgment, or exculpatory
clauses. 149 No tenant may be discriminated against in the
provision of services because of race, color, creed, religion, sex
or national origin l50 or in existing housing, because they are a
member of a class such as unmarried mothers or welfare
recipients. 151 These rules indicate the government's
recognition that Section 8 tenants need to be protected from
certain practices in the private market.
For the purpose of establishing an entitlement, the
expectation of continued occupancy is easily applied to the
Section 8 new construction and substantial rehabilitation
program. As with the public housing and subsidized housing
tenants, the federal involvement is manifest to the tenant. But
for the Section 8 statute and later assurances of Section 8
program participation, the tenants' units would not have been
built or substantially rehabilitated. The agreement between the
Section 8 owner and the federal government is for an initial
term of not more than five years subject to renewal for up to 20,
or in some circumstances 40 years if the owner complies with
necessary obligations. This expectation of continuing benefits
is also applicable to the tenant for whose benefit the Section 8
housing was created. Thus, as with public housing and
subsidized housing, the government has created an
expectation of continued occupancy in the Section 8 new
construction and substantial rehabilitation programs.
Under the Section 8 existing housing program there are
two major difficulties in establishing an entitlement to
continued occupancy of the assisted unit. First, the limited

147. HUD defines an eligible "family" to include an elderly,
mentally or physically handicapped, disabled or displaced
person as well as those families whose income does not
exceed limits set by HUD. See 24 C.F.R. §§880.102,
881.102 and 882.102.
148. See 42 U.S.C. §2000(d).
149. See 24 C.F.R. §§880.219(c), 881.219(c), 882.210(!)(3),
883.319(c) and 886.122(c).
150. See 24 C.F.R. §§880.219(b), 881.219(b), 882 App. VI(f),
883.219(b) and 886.122(b).
151. See 24 C.F.R. §882 App. II ( n.1, Nondiscrimination
in Housing provision in Housing Assistance Payments
Contract).
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duration of unit assistance poses a problem. The annual
contributions contract (ACC) between the PHA and HUD is
for a maximum of five years. The maximum term of the
housing assistance payments contract between the PHA and
owner is one to three years (congruent with the term of the
lease) with a provision to renew up to a total of five years if a
family continues in occupancy after the expiration of the one
to three year term.152 Second, under HUD regulations, 153 the
Certificate of Family Participation is viewed as the Section 8
benefit, not the unit. If evicted, the family may relocate to
another unit and continue to receive the benefit of the
certificate. It is HU D's position that an eviction therefore does
not interrupt the flow of the Section 8 benefit to the family.
Although these program rules undermine the expectancy
argument, there are several rebuttal arguments to be made
which eliminate their impact.
The duration problem may be overcome by looking to
the maximum period of the lease and the payments contract.
On the basis of the subsidized housing cases there is little doubt
that a tenant cannot be evicted for other than good cause
during the term of the lease, i.e., for one to three years up to a
renewal total of five years. The 30-day notice to terminate
provision 154 should not destroy the tenant's expectancy
because of the regulation's simultaneous requirement that the
landlord provide a lease of not less than one year. A reasonable
construction of this dual requirement would be that the
landlord must provide a lease for a minimum term of a year
which could be terminated (actually not renewed) by either
party giving 30 days' notice before the end of the year's term.
An argument for an expectancy beyond the initial lease
period, however, can be made based on the no'rmal practice in
both federally assisted and private housing for the landlord
and tenant to continue the initial lease period on a month-tomonth or renewal basis. In general, termination of such
tenancies is the exception rather than the ruJe. 155 The
expectancy of a Section 8 existing housing tenant therefore
should be based on maximum period of the housing assistance
payments contract. The Section 8 regulations provide that if a
family continues in occupancy after the expiration of the term
on the same terms and conditions as the original lease (or with
changes to the lease approved by the PHA), the housing
assistance contract shall continue in effect for the duration of
such tenancy up to a total period of five years.156 Thus, under
this view, existing housing tenants have an expectancy of five
years of continued occupancy.
A deprivation of occupancy within this five-year period
would exceed the de minimis line recently drawn by the
Supreme Court in Goss v. Lopez.15 7 In Goss, the Court held a
ten-day public school suspension to be a deprivation of a
property interest of which students may not be deprived
without notice and hearing. Surely a deprivation of any

See 24 C.F.R. §882.107.
See 41 Fed. Reg. 43330 (Sept. 30, 1976).
24 C.F.R. §882.107.
See Comment at 886, supra note 130. See also Comment,
Due Process Protection Under the Entitlement Doctrine for
Tenants of Federa/(1• Supported Housing, 6 GEORG. L. J.
130 I (1975).
156. 24 C.F.R. §882.!07.
157. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).

152.
153.
154.
155.
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duration prior to the expiration of the housing assistance
payments contract period should constitute a protectable
interest.
Even if the expectancy is found to be for only the period
of the initial lease, under certain circumstances, a Section 8
tenant should not be subject to eviction at the end of the term
of the lease merely because the landlord claims he or she no
longer wants to keep that particular unit in the program. For
example, if the tenant has complied with terms and conditions
of the lease, but the landlord wants to evict the particular
tenant claiming that the unit is no longer under the Section 8
program, the termination should not be permitted because the
landlord should not be able to indirectly act in retaliation
against the tenant. 158 Under this principle, the landlord should
not be permitted to take just one unit off the Section 8 market
if the landlord continues to participate in the program by
maintaining other units.159
The second major difficulty in establishing an
entitlement to continued occupancy of an existing housing
unit, HU D's position that the Section 8 benefit is attached to
the family and not the unit, may be overcome upon closer
examination of the Certificate of Family Participation as the
Section 8 "benefit." The Certificate merely indicates that the
family is eligible to receive Section 8 benefits if it finds a rental
unit which meets the family's needs and later receives final
approval from the P HA. 160 Possession of the specific housing
unit at an affordable rent constitutes the tangible benefit to the
tenant.
Along with the Section 8 rental unit, the tenant acquires
a "housing bundle" which includes participation in a
neighborhood, access to shops and schools, services,
transportation and other less tangible benefits attached to a
specific unit. Eviction may mean a loss of these benefits as well
as loss of the unit. Because of the shortage of housing for low
and very low income families, there is no assurance that the
family will be able to relocate in a decent, safe and sanitary unit
after eviction, 161 much less find another unit in the same
158. Cf Silva v. East Providence Housing Authority, 423 F.Supp.
453, 461 (D. R.I. 1976), where city council and housing
authority delayed construction of low income housing which
had been contracted with HUD. Municipalities are forbidden
from repudiating such cooperation agreements with HUD:
"it would be anomalous, to say the least, and quite destructive of national housing policy, if the officials of the
City and EPHA whose opposition and delay caused HUD
to terminate (the project) were permitted to accomplish by
indirection what they are barred from accomplishing by
direct action."
159. See Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp., 463 F.2d 853,
867 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (landlord may go out of business
entirely if he wishes to do so but his right to discontinue
rental of all of his units does not justify a partial closing
designed to intimidate remaining tenants in connection with
retaliatory eviction defense after tenant's assertion of housing code violations). The danger of this approach is that an
owner who maintains only a few Section 8 units could
decide to terminate them all to avoid good cause eviction
requirements for one tenant.
160. 24 C.F.R. §882.209.
161. See ge;,era/(1• Owens v. Housing Authority of City of
Stanford, 394 F.Supp. 1267, 1271 (D. Conn. 1975) (public
housing eviction constituted irreparable injury because of
scarcity of low.income housing).
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neighborhood. If a family must move to another PHA
jurisdiction to find housing after an eviction, the family may be
forced to compete with all other applicants for another
Certificate. 162 Finally, there are substantial financial costs to
any tenant who is required to move; moving costs and storage
expenses are particularly burdensome for low income tenants.
All of these factors argue against the interpretation of
possession of the Certificate as the benefit rather than
occupancy of the unit.
In summary, entitlement to continued occupancy in
Section 8 newly constructed and substantially rehabilitated
units may easily be established under the reasoning of previous
cases. Entitlement to continued occupancy of Section 8
existing housing units is more difficult to establish under
present HUD rules, but these rules may be successfully
challenged by the concepts of a five year expectancy and the
"occupancy" theory of benefit.

B.

Balancing the Interests of the Tenant, the
Private Landlord, and the Government: Right
to a Good Cause Hearing

Once state action and entitlement to continued
occupancy are established, courts must determine the
appropriate procedural safeguards under Goldberg 163 by
weighing the tenant and government interest in avoiding
interruption of the government Section 8 benefit against the
government's interest (and.the private landlord's interest) in a
summary procedure. As the Supreme Court recently outlined
in Mathews v. Eldridge, 164 it is a balancing process:
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due
process generally requires consideration of three
distinct faccors: first, the private interest that
will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards, and finally, the
governmental interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.165
In Eldridge the Court distinguished the welfare
termination procedure invalidated by Goldberg and held that
due process did not require an evidentiary hearing prior to the
termination of Social Security disability benefits _not based on
financial need. The present and proposed Section 8 eviction
procedures should be examined in light of the three factors
outlined in Eldridge.
The first factor to be considered under the Eldridge
standard is the private interest. The tenants' interest in
continued occupancy, as discussed above, 166 is in the financial

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
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24 C.F.R. §882.209(e)(2).
397 U.S. at 262-3 (1970).
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Id. at 335.
See textual discussion accompanying notes 161 and 162.

and social benefits derived from continued occupancy of the
unit chosen by the tenant to meet the family's needs. The
government shares the tenants' interest in stability through its
stated objective of affording every American decent, safe, and
sanitary housing and of encouraging stable communities.167
The arbitrary eviction of assisted families runs counter to this
shared private and governmental objective. In addition, since
Section 8 benefits are based on· financial need, the tenants'
interest is similar to that of the welfare recipient in Goldberg.
Deprivation of the Section 8 benefit means that a tenant would
be forced to accept a substandard dwelling in the private
market, or in the alternative, to pay much higher rent for
satisfactory housing and therefore live without other
necessities such as food, clothing and medical care. The private
owner's interest in administrative convenience must also be
considered. The government shares this interest through its
goal of attracting private participation in the program.
The risk of erroneous deprivation of Section 8 benefits is
the second factor to be considered under Eldridge. Under the
existing housing program, the PHA must send the notice to
vacate and authorize the eviction. In practice, however, most
PH As authorize any request for an eviction ifthe allegation of
the landlord presents a reason that would be sustainable under
the lease. For example, it is possible that if a landlord
represents to the PHA that a tenant has a dog in violation of a
lease provision, the PHA would authorize the eviction without
further investigation. The fact that the tenant maintains that
he does not own a dog and that the culprit belongs to the
neighbors may not be considered by the PHA. Another
situation which arises is the retention of security deposits by
the landlord. PH As often do not investigate a landlord's claim
for the security deposit and automatically approve payment.
As a result, the landlord uses the additional funds for repairs
on the unit (repairs which needed to be done when the tenant
moved in and not as a result of occupancy), and the tenant
loses the Section 8 benefit through the PHA policy of not
providing a relocation certificate for a family which
"damaged" a unit. Without a prior hearing, the tenant has no
way of preventing an erroneous deprivation.
For the new construction and substantial rehabilitation
program the problem is even more pronounced. There are no
procedural protections for tenants unless the owner wants
vacancy benefits for the 60-day period subsequent to the
eviction, in which case the landlord must certify that ten-day
notice was given and that the eviction did not violate the lease,
contract or any applicable law. No hearing is provided and
HUD has no mechanism to check on arbitrary evictions by the
owner. The tight housing market makes the risk of deprivation
particularly troublesome for low income tenants. A late rent
payment may automatically result in eviction when a welfare
check arrives a few days late or when a tenant is temporarily
laid off from work. There is also the risk that a tenant may be
evicted for the actions of others. For example, a tenant may be
evicted for damage to the unit, such as a broken window
caused by children in the neighborhood. During a tight
market, the landlord has little incentive to investigate such
matters.

167. 42 U.S.C. §1441a.
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Since there is considerable risk of erroneous deprivation
of Section 8 benefits through present procedures, the probable
value of additional or substitute procedural safeguards must
be considered. In Eldridge, the Court determined that the
written medical assessment of a worker's condition is a more
easily documented decision than the typical determination of
welfare entitlement where "a wide variety of information may
be deemed relevant, and issues of witness credibility and
veracity often are critical to the decision making process." 168
The Court further distinguished the welfare termination
procedure in its failure to provide an effective means for the
recipient to communicate his case to the decision-maker.
Written submissions were unrealistic because most recipients
lacked the "educational attainment necessary to write
effectively" and could not afford legal counseJ.169 A Section 8
tenant, like the welfare recipient 110 in Goldberg, would benefit
greatly from the opportunity to make an oral presentation
before a decision-maker.
A final factor to be considered under the Eldridge
standard is the governmental interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens the
additional procedures would entail. The government's interest
is twofold and potentially conflicting. The government shares
the tenants' interest in the stability of continued occupancy.
On the other hand, the government also has an interest in
private owner participation i11 the Section 8 program. If
governmental due process • standards are imposed on
landlords, many private owners may be uninterested in
participating in the program, especially if they can easily rent
the same unit ·to nonassisted families who could be evicted
without due process procedures.
In balancing these interests, courts could arrive at
alternative applications of a good cause eviction standard
which would not be too costly to the government in terms of
undue administrative burdens or endangering the success of
1
the Section 8 program.1 71 Under the existing program, the

168. 424 U.S. at 343-344 (1976) ..
169. Id. at 345.
170. A substantial percentage of tenants in conventional public
housing and subsidized housing receive public assistance.
Of the 388,432 families recertified for continued occupancy
in public housing during the 12-month period ending
September 30, 1976, 77 percent received assistance and/ or
benefits and 45 percent received assistance with or without
benefits (Table H-120). Of the 136,826 families certified for
occupancy in §236 housing during the same time period,
93 percent received assistance and/ or benefits and 80 percent received assistance with or without benefits (Table
H-60). Of the 93,203 families recertified for occupancy in
§236 housing, 95 percent received assistance and/ or benefits
and 77 percent received assistance with or without benefits
(Table H-68). "Assistance" is defined as funds given on
the basis of need by organizations, some private, but
primarily public. "Benefits" are non-salary funds not given
on the basis of need by governmental agencies (See note
to Table H-67). 1976 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, (Washington, D.C.). Similar information on
Section 8 families was unavailable.
171. For a more detailed discussion of possible acceptable solutions. see Note, supra note 130 at 1190-1196.
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PHA could apply its existing model grievance procedure
mechanism 172 to Section 8 tenants. This procedure provides
for notice, an informal hearing, access to documents and PHA
records relied upon in the eviction, personal appearances
before an impartial decision-making body, and a right to a trial
de novo. Since the PHA already is responsible for
authorization of Section 8 evictions from existing units, this
procedure would not add excessive burdens to the PHA
administration of the program.
Harm to the landlord is minimal because of safeguards
within the grievance procedure. For example, unless rent due
is deposited in an escrow account during the course of the
proceedings, the hearing procedure may be deemed waived. 173
If tenant behavior is hazardous to the health and safety of
other tenants, the landlord may avoid the model
procedures. 174 Although the grievance procedure may
constitute some measure of inconvenience to the landlord, on
balance, the tenants' interest in an inexpensive hearing should ·
prevail.
Application of the good cause standard to new
construction or substantial rehabilitation not administered by
the PHA could be accomplished in ways similar to the good
cause eviction standard for subsidized housing.11s Courts have
indicated that a federal good cause eviction standard may be
incorporated as a defense in state judicial eviction proceedings
as a way of meeting due process requirements. 176 This
mechanism would present no undue burden to the landlord
because of the necessity to go to court anyway. The good cause
requirement would merely require the landlord to give reasons
for the eviction and would give the tenant a right to produce
evidence of a contrary position.
An alternative procedure would be to require HUD to
implement an impartial hearing procedure on the issue of good
cause for proposed evictions. The need for an informal hearing
prior to the court proceeding is now under consideration by
HUD for subsidized housing. 177 Requiring the landlord and
tenant to talk in an informal setting may eliminate the cost to
both parties of the evictioh and rerental through the result of
reaching agreement prior to legal action. Such a hearing
should not eliminate the right to a trial de nova. Whatever the
solution, tenants should be afforded a right to an adjudication
of facts prior to an eviction, and landlords should be protected
by a process with as little delay and inconvenience as possible
consistent with a good cause requirement.
On balance, then, some type of prior evidentiary hearing
should be established to protect Section 8 tenants from

172.
173.
174.
175.

24 C.F.R. §§866.50, et seq.
24 C.F. R. §866.55(e).
24 C.F.R. §866.5l(a).
See Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973); Anderson
v. Denny, 365 F.Supp. 1254 (W.D. Va. 1973); Appel v.
Beyer, 39 Cal.App.3d Supp. 7, 114 Cal.Rptr. 336 (1974):
176. Where state summary procedures do not afford tenants the
opportunity to present federal constitutional defenses,
administrative hearings should be required. See Owens v.
Housing Authority of City of Stanford, 394 F.Supp. 1267,
1273 (D. Conn. 1975).
177. See 24 C.F.R. §§450 et seq .. 41 Fed. Reg. 43329 (Sept.
30. 1976).
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arbitrary ev1ct10ns. The good cause standard should be
instituted at the hearing, whether it be a PHA administrative
hearing or a judicial proceeding. Under the standards of
Goldberg and Eldridge, an oral presentation prior to eviction
would be the most appropriate means to safeguard Section 8
tenants' entitlement to an uninterrupted flow of Section 8
assistance.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Predictions regarding the success of establishing a good
cause eviction standard for Section 8 tenants vary according to
the special provisions and characteristics of the Section 8
subprograms. Although chances of establishing state action
appear most favorable in the existing housing program
because of PHA authorization of the eviction, existing
housing tenants will encounter relatively more difficulty in

justifying application of the good cause standard under the due
process entitlement doctrine because of HUD's interpretation
that the Certificate of Family Participation rather than the
unit constitutes the Section 8 benefit.
The balance falls the other way for the new construction
and substantial rehabilitation program. There are more
obstacles to showing the requisite state or governmental
action, but once it is established, application of the good cause
eviction standard to private developers follows by analogy to
the subsidized housing cases.
Although it is difficult to generalize, based on principles
already established for the conventional public housing and
FHA subsidized housing programs, a sound argument can be
made for the establishment of both a due process good cause
standard and a prior evidentiary hearing for tenants faced with
eviction from Section 8 assisted housing.

ENERGY ISSUES AFFECTING THE POOR:
A PRELIMINARY SURVEY

by

I.

Allison Beck*

INTRODUCTION

The past winters of severely cold weather and the
resulting energy problems have had a startling impact on the
lives of most Americans. Sacrifices are being requested, or in
many cases required, of all - rich and poor. But there can be
no doubt that those who have little or nothing to begin with
will suffer the most when asked to conserve or cut back; the
poor have no margin for saving. The need for providing
specific and direct attention and remedies to the energy
problems of low income Americans is apparent. To heat
homes, to drive to work or to the grocery store, to cook meals
- all involve the ability to pay for energy. Obviously, when it
is freezing and there is no money to pay for fuel, any longrange efforts to reduce the overall cost of energy to make it
more affordable for the poor will seem remote at best. What
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they need is the fuel now, or the money to pay for it. The energy
problem, therefore, must be considered on two levels: one
requiring stop-gap solutions, the other requiring some
comprehensive and long-range solutions.

II.

PROBLEMS REQUIRING
SHORT-TERM REMEDIES

IMMEDIATE,

A.

Unfair Credit Practices; Lack of Protective
Services; Consumer Advocacy

The 1973 Arab oil embargo introduced into the
headlines the phrase "energy crisis." The embargo set the stage
for the enactment of the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act
(EPAA), Pub.L. No. 93-159, but many of the regulations,
allocation procedures and price controls imposed by that
legislation have since been phased out. The EPAA also
touched on the critical area of protective services. How large a
deposit may a utility or fuel distributor demand before
beginning service? What kind of notice must a customer be
given before service is disconnected? What are valid reasons
CLEARINGHOUSE REVIEW

